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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERVIN J. RUSSELL and 
ADA J. RUSSELL, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GEYSER-MARION GOLD 
MINING COMP ANY, a 
corporation, The BOTHWELL 
CORPORATION, 
a corporation, et al, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10577 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs respondents claim title to grazing 
rights through conveyance and also by adverse pos-
session, of the mining claims here involved. 
Defendants claim by deed and to be record 
owners in fee simple of all mineral, surface, and 
grazing rights of all mining claims, and also assert 
that any claims of plaintiffs are barred by limita-
tions and latches and all rights are established in 
defendants under the statutes and as record own-
ers. Defendants further assert that all rights that 
existed in plaintiffs' predecessors were at most an 
assignable license, which rights were abandoned, 
1 
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extinguished and never asserted after 1044, and 
that defendants have had exclusive possession of 
and paid all taxes assessed on all mining claims 
involved since 1934. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found for plaintiffs and that 
their predecessors for many years had grazed said 
mining claims and retained title to use the surface 
for grazing purposes upon payment of one-half of 
all future general taxes. Said decision was bottomed 
upon the conveyance of May 23, 1934, Ex. 2. The 
decree further provided that the rights of plaintiffs 
to quiet title are not barred by statutes plead or 
any other statute of limitation, and in equity en-
joined defendants from interfering with the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Since the court's decision sounds in equity, 
and it is the prerogative and the duty of the appel-
late court to review both the law and the facts, de-
fendants request the court to review the law and 
the evidence and reverse the lower court with a 
mandate that judgment be entered for defendants 
and against plaintiffs with costs to defendants. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Abstract of Title, Ex. 15, shows that the 
J orgensens were the owners in fee simple of all of 
the mining claims here involved prior to June 7, 
1932. In the conveyance called the first grant of 
June 7, 1932 from Jorgensens to defendant and 
2 
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appellant, Geyse1·-Marion Gold Mining Company, 
the following is recited: 
"This grant is made subject to a reser-
vation in the Grantors of all surface rights, 
including existing springs and surface waters 
in and upon said claims." 
Thereafter, on May 24, 1934, the Jorgensens 
or the same Grantors, by another conveyance called 
the second grant, conveyed to Glen R. Bothwell all 
of the mining claims conveyed in the former con-
veyance of June 7, 1932 and also other mining 
claims, the aggregate of which constitute all min-
ing claims involved in this litigation. In the second 
grant dated May 24, 1934 and recorded May 31, 
1934, Ex. 2, and abstract entry 106 no such words 
as "subject to reservations" or "with reservations", 
appear, and said conveyance, Ex. 2, after describ-
ing said claims contained the following: 
"The Grantee herein agrees that the 
Grantors shall have the right to use the sur-
face of the ground for grazing purposes, the 
grazing to be done in such a manner as not 
to interfere with any mining that the Gran-
tee elects to do. The Grantors agree to pay 
one-half the general taxes assessed against 
the land, as long as it is not used for mining 
purposes." 
"This deed is intended to convey any 
after acquired title obtained by the Grantors." 
The estate of Glen R. Bothwell or said grantee 
under said second grant was probated and all rights 
he had under said second grant, Ex. 2, were distri-
3 
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buted to the legatees named in his estate as is shown 
in the Decree of Distribution, Ex. 3. See also Entry 
No. 117 of the Abstract. Thereafter, said legatees 
conveyed all of said mining claims to the Bothwell 
Corporation, Ex. 4. Abstract Entry 119. There-
after, the Bothwell Corporation conveyed all of its 
interest obtained under the second grant in all of 
said mining claims to defendant and appellant, 
Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company. After re-
cording Ex. 5 supplemental Abstract Entry 4, 
Geyser-Marion had all interests conveyed under both 
the first and second grant. The exhibits show that 
all deeds were recorded. Subsequent to the record-
ing of both the first and second grants aforesaid, 
the J orgensens by a third transfer transferred only 
"the grazing rights upon the following described 
lands" to A. C. Nordell. See Abstract Entry No. 
110, 111, and 112. Nordell grazed livestock on said 
claims and paid one-half the general taxes thereon 
to defendants for the years 1942, 1943, 1944. See 
Ex. 7, 8, 9, 10 the original book entries, and Re-
quests for Admissions for checks from A. C. Nor-
dell's checking account and T259-15. Nordell trans-
ferred the interest he had in said property to Tony 
Castango in 1945. Abstract Entry 154. 
Castango tr an sf erred to Rose Castango in 1960 
Ex. 22. Rose Castango's interest was transferred 
to the Russells, the present plaintiffs, in 1960, sup-
plemental Abstract Entry 6. The outline attached 
to the first page of the cover outlines said transfers. 
4 
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Herein, Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company 
and its predecessors in interest shall be referred to 
as defendant or Geyser-Marion and present plain-
tiffs, Russell, and plaintiffs' predecessors in in-
terest shall be referred to as plaintiff. 
The mining claims involved in the litigation 
amount to about 608 acres. From and after 1944 
Owen Ault grazed livestock on and leased all of 
said mining claims from and paid rental to defend-
ant each and every year until the commencement of 
this action. Ex. 14 is the lease betwen Geyser-Marion 
and Owen Ault involving the period immediately 
preceding the filing of this action. Ex. 11, 12, 13 
show the payment of rental by Ault to defendant 
and Ex. 25 is the receipts and checks for rental 
payments on said claims which Ault produced under 
subpoena. Said lease, Ex. 14, contains about 2,200 
acres, which defendant leases to Ault. Only 608 
acres are involved in this litigation, they being mix-
ed in among the other 1,500 acres, and some being 
southwesterly of Mercur and the others being scat-
tered among the said 1,500 acres in the vicinity of 
Mercur, see Ex. 19. Ault also leased about 400 acres 
of mining claims from Gover Gold Mining Company 
and about 480 acres of mining claims from Mc-
Cormick T204-l. The aggregate acreage of mining 
claims leased by Ault was about 3,080 acres form-
ing the solid area colored in green on Ex. 18, 203-28. 
Mr. Roy Bothwell is and has been the presi-
5 
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dent and director of defendant, Geyser-Marion since 
1942, Tl36-17, and had handled mattern of the com-
pany in dealings with Mr. Ault who leased the 
mining claims involved in this litigation from Gey-
ser-Marion. Ault testified that he presumed the 
Bothwells owned the Geyser-Marion claims, Tl52-
12. Ault testified that he ran livestock on said 
mining claims every year without missing a year 
since 1944 or 1945 and that he has never missed a 
payment for the leasing of said claims, T154-9, 
and Castango admitted Ault grazed same, T46-27, 
T-48-8, T53-26 as also did Russell, T26-l. 
Tl36-5 is further varification that Ault paid 
the money to Bothwells as are the records produced 
by Bothwell, president of Geyser- Marion, Ex. 11, 
12 and 13. See also T204-19 and also Ex. 25 con-
taining the checks and rental receipts produced by 
Ault under subpoena. 
Ault ran 1,400 head of shep on said claims for 
20 years, Tl46-ll. 
Ault stated he ran 40 head of cattle on said 
claims since 1945, Tl59-l to 4. 
Exhibit 18 is the personal map owned by the 
lessee, Ault, which he produced under subpoena in 
court, T24-20. 
Ault spent all of his time in said area for 20 
years, T145-27. 
To color the map, Ex. 18, Ault took the claim 
6 
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numbers from the leases and located said claims 
physically on the ground by blazes on trees and 
monument numbers and colored the area in green 
on Ex. 18, his map, Tl48-24. 
All facts above related are undisputed, with no 
evidence to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT ON THE FACTS 
POINT I. 
WHERE EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO THE FIND-
ING OF THE COURT PLAINTIFF FAILS IN BURDEN 
OF PROOF AND DEFENDANT PREVAILS PARTICU 
LARL Y IN AN EQUITY CASE. 
From the entire period from 1944 to 1957 Tony 
Castagna is the only predecessor, through which 
plaintiffs must prove possession or the grazing of 
said mining claims or any rights with respect there-
to. Castagna admitted that he had never tried to 
locate a mining claim and could not locate a claim, 
and on direct examination for plaintiffs' case, 
testiied as follows: 
T45-30 Q. Mr. Castagna, are you ac-
quainted with the general location of the min-
ing claims described in the deed I showed you 
on the ground? 
A. Well, I couldn't point them out just 
where they was, no." 
Despite the fact that plaintiffs' proof failed to 
show the grazing of a single mining claim for even 
a day from 1945 to 1957, their case was even weaker 
after cross examination since Castango did not even 
7 
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know which numng claims were invoked in this 
litigation. 
Castagno also indicated that he couldn't tell 
if he was trespassing and could not identify where 
any particular claim was. 
T 56-4 Q. "I ask you a question. I want 
you to answer it, Mr. Castango, as to whether 
or not you personally took a map and identi-
fied any one of these claims? 
A. No. 
Q. But you didn't take a map and try 
to identify where these particular claims 
were? 
A. No. 
Q. You knew, did you not, that some of 
these trees had blazes on them with numbers 
on them? 
A. Yes." 
T 91-29 When asked whether his cattle were 
on Gold Coin, he claimed they were, and when it was 
pointed out to him that Gold Coin claims were not 
involved in this litigation, and he was asked to name 
a single claim involved in this litigation and he 
stated that he could, he named Gold Bug, and Gold 
Bug is not a claim involved in this litigation T 92-
22. 
Q. "You don't know whether your cattle 
were on the Heclas or not do you? 
A. No I don't." 
The Heclas, constituting a group of five mining 
8 
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claims, was the largest area of claims (just north of 
Mercur) involved in this case. The witness was 
then asked: 
T92-25 Q. "Alright, you can't identify 
a single claim's name that your cattle were 
on, can you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Vhich one? 
A. Gold Bug. 
Q. Gold Bug? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The Gold Bug isn't even involved in 
this litigation. 
A. It sure is." 
Actually the Gold Bug claim is not involved in 
this litigation as disclosed from the pleadings. Cas-
tagno also indicated he did not know where any 
particular claim was or whether he was trespass-
ing, T91-24. The questions and answers demonstrate 
that the witness did not even know what mining 
claims were involved in this litigation much less 
their location or whether he had grazed any of them. 
From 1957 to 1960 Rose Castagno was the im-
mediate predecessor to plaintiff. Rose Castagno was 
even more confused than was Tony Castagno. She 
did not even know where the claims were located 
with respect to Sparrow Hawk Spring or the Milk 
Ranch, T62-6. She did not even know where the 
grave yard was, which was identified as being on 
9 
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the northeast edge of the lower group of claims, 
T64-14. 
Plaintiff, Russell claimed he sta1·ted grazing 
in the spring of 1961, T25-16. Russell had no map 
to identify where the mining claims were. T35-20. 
He never did locate any particular claim, T36-1. 
He admitted that he knew that Ault's livestock had 
grazed the area where he purportedly thought said 
mining claims were located for a period of ten years, 
Tl4-9. He also admitted that he knew that Ault 
had been operating sheep in the area for up to 20 
years, Tl3-28, and he knew that Ault leased from 
the Bothwells, Tl4-27. 
Under all of plaintiff's evidence there was not 
a scintilla of evidence to show that any particular 
claim had ever been grazed in any particular single 
year or for any period, even one day. Yet the lower 
court found: 
"3. For many years last past plaintiffs 
and their predecessor in interest have used 
the surface of said mining claims for live-
stock grazing." 
The evidence is conclusive that Ault, defend-
ant's lessee, had exclusive possession of and grazed 
all of said mining claims from and after 1944. 
Ault claimed that he never at any time had 
any interfe1·ence by Castagno in grazing said claims, 
T155-30. 
The defendant Russell under his testimony 
claimed that subsequent to 1961 he grazed part of 
10 
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the claims in common with Ault; however, the 
transcript discloses the following evidence from 
Ault: Tl55-30 
Q. "Did Mr. Castagna ever run any 
sheep or cattle on any of the claims that you 
were leasing from Bothwell? 
A. Never run any sheep on there that I 
know anything about. 
Q. Never had any sheep on any of 
them? 
A. No." 
Mr. Mervin Russell plaintiff testified that he 
ran sheep in common with those of Ault and Ault 
upon being cross examined by counsel as to whether 
or not Russell ever had any livestock on said claims 
Ault answered: 
T 199-84 "There has been no sheep in 
there outside of mine at no time. 
Q. You are positive of that? 
A. I am positive of it." 
Moreover, Ault's cattle consumed all of the 
growth available for grazing and he observed it 
and so testified, Tl67-5 and testified that only his 
cattle had been in the area since 1944, T167-19. 
The Mercur Bench area is where the lower 
group of mining claims are located and when Ault 
was asked whether he had seen anybody's cattle on 
this lower group of claims since 1945, he testified 
that he had not, Tl 70-21 to 28. \Vhen he was speci-
11 
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fically asked whether he had seen Castagno's or 
Russell's cattle up by Sparrow Hawk or near the 
northern groups of claims in connection with the 
water that was used and he indicated he had not 
and that no one had interferred with same, T-159-
18. 
Ault stated he built a reservoir about seven 
years ago near the Sparrow Hawk Spring which 
spring is shown on Ex. 19 as being on the south 
easternly portion of the Black Shale claim involved 
in this litigation, and it was not disputed that there 
was not water in the water trough by said spring, 
Castagna T278-18, Ault T235-30, except as turned 
therein through the pipe. 
Ault indicated he leased said mining claims 
every year since 1944, ran sheep on them and paid 
rental for the use of said claims, and that he never 
missed a payment on said lease, Tl54-9; and that 
prior to the commencement of this action he never 
complained aobut anyone else using said claims, 
Tl55-17; and p1·ior to 1964 he never complained to 
the Bothwells about Russell trespassing, Tl55-19; 
and he never complained to Bothwell about Cas-
tagna trespassing, Tl55-28; and that Castagno 
never ran any cattle on any of the claims he was 
leasing from Bothwell, T155-30. After Ault built 
the reservoir no one elses cattle used the same, 
T158-16. Russell could not get in to use the Hecla 
claims or the Mary Jean claims or the Douglas claim 
without trespassing on other claims leased by Ault, 
12 
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Tl61-9. Neither Russell nor the Castagnos ever 
grazed said claims, Tl61-18. Ault had no trouble 
with either Castagno or Russell running their sheep 
north of Mercur, Tl67-2, and no one else ever ran 
any livestock near the Milk Ranch since 1944, 
Tl67-19. Ault leased the mining claims known as 
the Milk Ranch since 1944, Tl68-4. Milk ranch was 
on claims Ault leased but not involved in this case 
and was west of the Hecla group see Ex. 18, and 
Tl56-9. Ault was in the area during the grazing 
seasons several times a week, Tl68-24. No cattle 
excep Aults were near the Heclas, Tl 70-14 since 
1945, Tl 70-24. Ault visited the spring near Spar-
row Hawk nearly every day, Tl80-27, and he ex-
amined the area and found that no cattle had ever 
watered there except his own, Tl 79-26. All of the 
water that left the spring was contained within a 
pipe and none escaped, Tl92-22. They had a big 
box with a lock and a key where they could turn 
the water out, T224-30, and all of the water ran 
to Mercur, T234-12; Ault passed the area practic-
ally every day, Tl81-21. Ault claimed that no other 
cattle had ever been in the Milk Ranch area Tl98-
21, and he was positive of it, Tl99-8. 
All water at Sparrow Hawk Spring flowed into 
a pipe and all of it went to Mercur and the water 
had to be turned out of the pipe to put any water 
tn the trough or in the reservoir, Tl93-14. There 
was a box over the spring which had to be unlocked 
to control or release any water, T224-27. No water 
13 
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flowed out of the mine and was all contained with-
in the pipe, and was turned out of the pipe into the 
trough, Tl96-2, and was all under Bothwell's or 
Ault's control. 
Ault was at the reservoir almost every day 
and there was no evidence that anyone else even 
used the water that he placed in the same, T222-17, 
and no livestock but his own used said reservoir, 
Tl 79-30, as was disclosed from his visits practic-
ally every day, T-180-27. 
A son of Ault's herded sheep for him for about 
20 years, T283-20 between Sunshine Canyon and 
the grave yard which included all of the mining 
claims in the lower group which made a complete 
circle for grazing as is shown colored green on Ex. 
18, and ( Ault's son) never saw any of Castagno's 
sheep in said area at any time, and he grazed Ault's 
sheep there, T284-l 7, until all of the feed was gone, 
T284-18. Mrs. Ault, the wife of lessor, had knowledge 
of Aults sheep grazing there and hauled water into 
this area to water the sheep, T213-19 and had 
personal knowledge of her husband placing sheep 
on the southern area of claims, T214-20 and on the 
Black Sheep claim T230-18, and knew that her hus-
band had had sheep in Mercur Canyon since 1922, 
T-224-5, and Ault himself had never seen any other 
livestock on the Mercur Bench area or the southern 
group of claims, T170-22. 
The claims were even named that were involved 
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in this litigation and Ault was asked if he had seen 
any persons cattle or sheep on any of said claims 
01· on any of the land marked in green on Ex. 18 
and he stated that he saw neither sheep or cattle 
grazing said area, Tl59-21 to 30, Tl60-l to 10. 
Again these specific questions were asked Ault 
whether or not he had seen Russell or any of his 
herds try to graze the Heclas or any of the group 
marked in red on Ex. 19 and he stated he had not 
Tl61-18. Ault was asked if it was necessary for 
others to trespass on other claims Ault leased in 
order to graze the Hecla claims. He replied they had 
to trespass, Tl61-9. 
Since the court in equity reviews the facts as 
well as the law, counsel takes the position that 
plaintiff has not only failed to carry the burden of 
proof but the evidence is conclusive that defendant 
Geyser-Marion has exercised complete exclusive con-
trol and possession of all claims involved in this liti-
gation through its lessee Ault since 1944. 
Respondent did introduce some evidence of 
cattle being near Milk Ranch, no year was stated, 
and Milk Ranch area is 3 miles from the lower 
groups of claims and a mile and a half from Black 
Shale Claim in the upper group, and not adjacent 
to or near any claim involved in this litigation, 
Tl56-9 and see Ex. 18. 
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ARGUMENT ON THE LA vV 
POINT II. 
GENERALLY THE INSTRUMENT IS CONSTRU-
ED IN FAVOR OF THE GRANTEE. AND FEE SIMPLE 
TITLE IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PASSED TO GRAN-
TEE. 
The fore part of this point is copied directly 
from Meager vs. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P 2d 989, 123 
U 123. In the Meager case, the Supreme Court of 
Utah quotes 16 Am Jur 530; 23 Am Jur 2nd has 
since superceded 16 Am Jur, and the following 
quotes appea1· to show the recent trend to resolve 
all doubts against the Grantor, and to transfer the 
largest interest Gran tor could convey: 
23 Am Jur 2d 212 Para. 165 CONSTRUC-
TION IN FAVOR OF GRANTEE 
"Most courts agree that if there is any 
ambiguity rendering a deed subject to altern-
ative constructions, that construction will be 
adopted which is more favorable to the Gran-
tee than to the Grantor, all doubts being re-
solved against the Grantor. This rule of con-
struction is particularly applicable to avoid 
limitations on the grant, restraints upon ali-
enation, or to prevent an unreasonable result. 
It is made statutory in some jurisdictions. 
The rule is predicated upon the reason-
ing that since a grant is expressed in words 
of the Grantor's own selection, it is, prima 
facie ,an expression of his intention, and he 
is therefore chargeable with the language 
used. If, therefore, the deed can inure in dif-
ferent ways, the Grantee, it is said, may take 
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it in such way as will be most to his advan-
tage. Thus, where ambiguous or uncertain in 
such respect, a deed is usually regarded as 
conveying the largest interest which the Gran-
tor could convey." 
The Grantors by the first grant were very 
articulate and reserved the surface and water rights. 
However, under the second grant Ex. 2, Grantors 
granted and vested all interest in all mining claims 
in said Grantee. This was done in the fore part of 
the deed. Thereafter, having intended that all of 
the interest was vested in said Grantee, the Gran-
tor, without using words of "reservation" or "sub-
ject to" or like words intended to limit the grant; 
The second grant contained the following 
words: 
"Grantee agrees that Grantor shall have the 
right to use the surf ace of the ground for 
grazing purposes." 
This shows no intent to limit the grant or re-
serve any right. Neither does it show said license 
was a perpetual license. 
This further demonstrates that the intent of 
the parties was that the Grantee be vested with 
all of the title without limitation since Grantee 
would be powerless to make an agreement with re-
spect to property Grantee did not own. After hav-
ing received title without limitation Grantee could 
only then agree to the Grantor's right to use, the 
same and only on certain conditions. 
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Section 57-1-3 U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
"A fee simple is presumed to be intended 
to pass by conveyance unless it appears from 
the conveyance that a lesser estate was in-
tended." 
It does not appear from the instrument, Ex. 2, 
that a lesser estate was intended. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
Hanes vs. Hunt, 85 P 2d 861, made the distinction 
between a liniitation upon a grant and a mere 
license. The court states: 
"The deed to Hunt also contained a clause, 
'Reserving and excepting unto the grantor' 
the grazing rights and the use of the water 
for watering livestock. A reservation and ex-
ception from a grant is persuasive that the 
grant was more than a license." 
Even where the words reserving and excepting 
grazing and water rights are used the court indi-
cates it is only persuasive that the grant was more 
than a license. It would therefore appear that the 
absence of the use of the words reserving and ex-
cepting with no water would indicate that it was a 
license. 
In the case at bar while there was such limita-
tion upon the first grant, there was no such limita-
tion upon the second grant. 
There was such a limitation upon the grant 
in the first deed, and in 1936 before the Geyser-
Marion acquired the grant of the additional rights 
under Ex. 2, it brought an action to quiet title with 
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respect to only one of the claims involved in this 
litigation. Since Geyser-Marion had not at that time 
acquired the enlarged interest under the second 
grant, recognition of the second grant by Jorgen-
sens to Bothwell is shown in said decree by the fact 
that the administrator of the Bothwell estate is 
made a party to the action and rights reserved in 
the first grant were not awarded to Geyser-Marion. 
This was because Geyser-Marion did not receive 
the enlarged rights under the second grant until 
a number of years after the said decree had been 
entered. 
Counsel for plaintiffs overlooked the fact that 
when Geyser-Marion commenced said action that 
Geyser-Marion had not at that time acquired said 
rights under the second grant, Ex. 2 when counsel 
claimed it supported his cause in the lower court. 
Continuing on in the habendum of Ex. 2 in the 
case at bar the following is contained: 
"The grazing to be done in such a man-
ner as to not interfere with any mining that 
the Gran tee elects to do." 
Roberts vs. Lynn, 73 N.E. at 524 
'"The question there, and in the case now 
before us, is decided by determining whether, 
as matter of construction, the contract gave 
the other party exclusive possession of the 
premises against the world, including the 
owner, or gave him a license to occupy under 
the owner, in which case the rights of the 
other party rest in contract." 
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Tips vs. U. S., 70 F 2d 525: 
"A mere permission to use land, domi-
nion over it remaining in the owner and no 
interest in or exclusive possession of it being 
given, is but a license. 35 C. J. Landlord & 
Tenant Para. 10." 
Since in the case at bar the defendant had the 
right to mine and oust plaintiffs from the use of 
the area being mined, said plaintiffs have only a 
contract or license and not such an interest in land 
as will support a quiet title action. 
Saxman vs. Christmann, 79 P 2d 520: 
"It is said in 17 Ruling Case Law 568, 
Para. 81: 
'Whether an instrument is a license or 
a lease depends generally on the manifest in-
tent of the parties gleaned from a considera-
tion of its entire contents.' 
Tested by this rule, there can be no ques-
tion but that this permit is only a license to 
use the land. The rule applicable to this per-
mit is well stated in 17 Ruling Case Law 570, 
Para. 83, as follows: 
'A clearly defined distinction is drawn 
by the authorities between agreements which 
create a lease of the land for mineral pur-
poses and those which are simply a license giv-
ing to the licensee authority to enter and 
operate for minerals. While under a lease an 
interest or estate in the land itself is created, 
under a license the licensee has no interest 
or estate in the land itself, but only in the 
proceeds, and in such proceeds, not as realty, 
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but as personal property, and his possession 
is the possession of the owner. In general, a 
contract simply giving a right to take ore 
from a mine, no interest or estate being grant-
ed, confers a mere license, and the licensee 
acquires no right to the ore until he separ.:. 
ates it from the freehold. * * *' " 
In the case at bar the only right that the plain-
tiffs had was the right to remove the forage from 
the surface and no other. The evidence shows all 
available water was used by Ault and none by plain-
tiffs. Not even the use of the springs which were 
controlled with a key. In the first grant Grantor 
was very articulate and reserved the right to the 
surface water and the springs and thereafter the 
same grantor made a second grant containing the 
words "agreement" expressing the intent that it 
constituted but an agreement and used the word 
"use" signifying a license rather than a sole occu-
pancy and specifying only grazing purposes subser-
vient to (the main purpose of said land in the minds 
of the parties,) to-wit: mining purposes. This all 
gives strength to the position that having made a 
second grant, grantor was not doing a useless act 
but was parting with something retained under the 
first grant to-wit: all surface rights. The words 
used in the second grant are consistent with the con-
veying of all surface rights with only a conditional 
license or contract. This is true without relying 
upon the presumptions of the common law or 57-1-3 
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U.C.A. 1953 which compel construing the same 
against grantor, and conveying all interest or the 
fee. 
POINT III. 
A SUIT TO QUIET TITLE MUST BE SUPPORTED 
BY AN INTEREST IN LAND AND IS NOT THE AP-
PROPRIATE REMEDY UPON A CONTRACT OR TO 
ENFORCE RIGHTS UNDER A LICENSE. 
Saxman vs. Christmann, 79 P 2d 521 the case 
quoted above where the party could remove min-
erals supports this point, and the court held: 
"Of course the defendant under the use 
permit has rights that the law will protect, 
but her rights are not such as to entitle her 
to maintain the present action. If her occu-
pancy or possession of the premises is wrong-
fully invaded she can resort to the action of 
forcible entry and detainer as she or her pre-
decesor in interest did as shown in Crismon 
v. Christmann, 44 Ariz. 201, 36 P 2d 257. 
The judgment of the lower court is re-
versed and the cause remanded with direc-
tions to dismiss the action." 
The court above held that in a case where one ' 
could remove mineral, the remedy of plaintiff's 
was not a quiet title action but a right under the 
contract or an action against those interfering with 
said right. Plaintiff's predecessors in interest part-
ed with their interest in the claims under the second 
grant, Ex. 2 and had only a conditional use for : 
grazing purposes which is not such an interest in 
land as will support a quiet title action as the lower 
court granted. 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV. 
AN ACTION UPON A CONTRACT OR TO PURSUE 
REMEDIES UNDER A WRITTEN LICENSE MUST BE 
COMMENCED WITHIN SIX YEARS. 
Plaintiffs and Castagno had both actual knowl-
edge and constructive notice of the fact that de-
fendants leased to Ault and Ault grazed sheep on 
said claims since 1945. An action to recover mesne 
profits of real property or on a written contract 
must be commenced within six years. 
Defendants at R 45 plead 78-12-23 U.C.A. 
1953. Defendant collected rental from Ault on all 
claims for all years following 1945. Ault's livestock 
grazed all of said claims under a contract with 
defendants for all years since 1944. Defendants 
had no notice of adverse claims from Ault Tl55-27 
or by anyone, including Castagno or Russell, T-266-
11. Defendants refused to recognize Castagno after 
Nordell assigned to him in 1945, Entry No. 154 of 
the Absract, and defendants immediately leased said 
claims to Ault for all years following said assign-
ment. Plaintiff's predecessors Castagno must have 
commenced any action within six years after Ault 
used said claims for grazing purposes. This is true 
because Castagno knew Ault was grazing sheep on 
said claims T46-25, and actual knowledge is even 
better than constructive notice, and Castagno stated 
Ault's sheep were there from 1945 to 1956. To re-
cover mesne profits of real property or grazing 
rights if any they had, said action must have been 
commenced within six years. 
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Moreover, said predecessors were on notice that 
1/2 of the general taxes must be paid as a condi-
tion of the right to graze (Entry 106 of the Ab-
stract) and they never paid or tendered 1/2 of the 
general taxes for any year since 1946 to maintain 
said contract in good standing; therefore their rights 
are lost. 
POINT V. 
A LICENSE IS NOT ASSIGNABLE AND DOES 
NOT PASS WITH THE LAND. 
The instrument, Ex. 2, under which plaintiffs 
as the 4th assignees claim, omitted the words, "suc-
cessors and assigns" with respect to plaintiff's pre-
decessors or Grantor. Since the instrument is con-
strued against said Grantor and most favorable to 
Grantee, Grantor had only a personal right to graze 
said claims, which right was not assignable. 
33 Am J ur 403 Para. 98 
"It is an element of a license in real pro-
perty that it is a personal right, and such a 
personal right, and such a license is, as such, 
incapable of being assigned or transferred 
by the person to whom it is granted, at least 
in the absence of a provision in the instru-
ment or agreement granting the license, which 
authorizes assignment. It does not pass with 
the land." 
This is not a restrictive covenant that runs 
with the land like the covenant in the Sine case 376 
P 2d 940 where both parties sign a covenant that a , 
motel will not be erected on said property where the 
cases have held that such a covenant runs with the 
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land. Moreover, in a restrictive covenant no further 
performance is required by either grantor or gran-
tee to keep the same in force. In the case at bar the 
grantor had only a license, not a restrictive coven-
ant and the grantee agreed the said Grantor may 
use said claims for grazing purposes, provided it 
did not interfere with mining and grantor was to 
pay one-half the general taxes. 
The courts hold that a restrictive covenant runs 
with the land. The common law holds otherwise 
with respect to a license. Grantee had the right to 
determine that other persons may be objectionable 
in their grazing of said claims. Since the instru-
ment is construed against Grantors, it must be as-
sumed that Grantee approved the right of Grantor 
to graze the same and reserved the right to deter-
mine whether said grazing right would or would 
not be recognized in subsequent assignees. 
Counsel may attempt to attach some signifi-
cance to the fact that Nordell, an assignee of the 
original Grantor was permitted to graze livestock 
on said claims and did pay to defendants' prede-
cessor one-half of the general taxes for the years, 
1943, 1944 and 1945. However, an assignee of a 
license may continue on and the licensor may accept 
payments from an assignee of said licensee. This 
does not make the license a perpetual license or is 
the licensor prevented from refusing to recognize 
any further assignments by having recognized one. 
Moreover, it is more significant that the defendants 
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not only refused to recognize Castagna, N ordell's 
immediate assignee, but also refused to recognize 
any assignee after Nordell. Also following the as-
signment by Nordell, defendants' immediately leas-
ed all of said claims to Owen Ault, who grazed live-
stock on all claims and paid all rental thereon for 
all years after 1944. Castagna neither made com-
plaints to defendants about Ault grazing sheep nor 
did he claim any grazing rights despite the fact that 
he well knew Ault was leasing said claims from de-
fendant and grazing sheep on said claims. The only 
time Castagna complained to Ault was once in 1945, 
T 48-11, Plaintiff had the burden and did not show 
otherwise. The law should presume that Ault was 
not so stupid as to pay rental for grazing purposes 
for 20 years on mining claims others were grazing. 
POINT VI. 
NEITHER PARTY CAN ENFORCE A MUTUAL 
COVENANT AGAINST THE OTHER WITHOUT SHOW- ' 
ING PERFORMANCE OR A TENDER OF PERFORM-
ANCE ON HIS OWN PART. 
This point is copied word for word from 14 
Am J ur 499 Para. 12. 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proof to show 1 
performance. The claim of adverse possession as 
set forth as plaintiff's position in the pre-trial order 
is a claim of acquiring said right by hostile, adverse, 
possession. Such a position is repugnant to and in-
consistant with specific performance or mutual per-
formance. It also totally lacks the elements of "he 
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who seeks equity must do equity" or "performance" 
or "showing a tender of performance" or "clean 
hands." Moreover, plaintiffs never did claim per-
formance and could not when as an alternative 
remedy they claimed by adverse possession. Russell 
testified that he was acquainted with the claims for 
30 years, T6-4, and that he knew of Aults operation 
in the area for 15 to 20 years Tl3-29, and Russell 
knew Ault leased from Bothwell. This was all be-
fore he obtained his alleged grazing rights. Russell 
also knew the claims were not used for mining pur-
poses T 22-6 and that Owen Ault was leasing said 
claims and using the same for grazing purposes. 
From the record plaintiff was also charged with 
knowledge of the fact that to enjoy grazing rights 
one-half of the general taxes must have been paid 
to defendant. Yet he had no information concern-
ing whether any predecessors had or had not paid 
one-half of said taxes, Tl8-13. Plaintiff never ten-
dered any taxes or any portion of same to defend-
ant even though he claimed to have grazed said 
claims for three years. Plaintiffs neither plead nor 
carried the burden of proof of "confession and 
avoidance" by confessing they owed one-half of the 
taxes on a plea to avoid payment. Moreover the facts 
neither supported a prima facie case for the relief 
which the court granted, nor did they show a con-
tract if one was in force. 
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POINT VII. 
A PARTY SEEKING TO QUIET TITLE TO REAL-
TY, OR REMOVE A CLOUD THEREON WILL, AS A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE RELIEF, BE COM-
PELLED TO DO EQUITY. 
This point is a direct quote from 74 C.J.S. 142 
Par. 94. 
Plaintiffs claimed under the pre-trial order R 
46, that they were entitled to possession by reason 
of adverse possession. Such a position supported by 
some evidence that they had used the land for graz-
ing without tendering one-half of the taxes for the 
use they had made or will in the future make is 
offensive to equity or the requirement that '"he who 
seeks equity must do equity" which should require 
judgment for defendants. This is particularly true 
where the recorder's office charges them with notice. 
POINT VIII. 
PAYMENT OF ALL TAXES ASSESSED AGAINST 
ALL MINING CLAIMS AND COLLECTING ALL RENT-
ALL FROM A TENANT WHO USED SAID CLAIMS 
FOR GRAZING PURPOSES WITH NO NOTICE TO 
DEFENDANTS OF ADVERSE CLAIMS SINCE 1945 
EXTINGUISHED ANY RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS AND 
ESTABLISHED TITLE IN DEFENDANT. 
Where the owner of land leases it to a tenant 
who annually without interruption pays rental there-
on with no complaints of any adverse claims, or 
others using the land since 1945, the owner is pre· 
sumed to have exclusive possession, and has extin-
guised any rights of others whether by license con· 
tract or otherwise. Under these facts, plaintiffs and 
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the predecessors must be presumed either to have 
ubandoned their rights or recognized that the con-
tract was not assignable and that they had no rights. 
Castagno saw Aults cattle on what he thought were 
the claims involved in the year 1945, T 46-22. Cas-
tagno talked with Ault at that time, and it must be 
presumed that Castagna either concluded he had no 
rights or abandoned any he had since there is no 
further evidence of any discussion, or complaints 
after 1945 by Castagna. 
Moreover, where defendant has paid all taxes 
assessed on the claims since 1934, plaintiffs have no 
claim or right of any kind much less the right to 
enjoin this defendant from interfering with their 
use of said claims. 
After defendants plead and proved exclusive 
use and collection of all the rentals on all mining 
claims since 1944 and proved payment of all the 
taxes on all mining claims since 1934, and that 
they had never had any notice, actual or construc-
tive, of anyone interfering with the possessory rights 
of their tenant, defendant should prevail. There was 
direct uncontradicted evidence that defendants had 
no notice of adverse claims, T268-1, and there was 
no evidence to the contrary. In the other hand, all 
clef en nan ts' predecessors and the world knew defend-
ants had leased said claims to Ault, and that Ault 
was using said claims for grazing purposes and 
paying rent to defendant for said grazing rights. 
Plaintiffs not only had the burden of proof 
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but also offered no proof to the contrary or offered 
any proof that anyone complained to defendants 
or their p1·edecesors in interest or gave them any 
notice of any adverse claims or trespass, or that 
there was any reason why a reasonable person should 
have known of adverse claims under constructive 
notice, since rental was paid annually without com-
plaint and Ault testified he never complained to 
defendant about Castagno being on the property, 
T155-27. 
Defendant also plead, 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-
12-12.1 R 21 and 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953 R 45 which 
under the facts should not only prevent the relief , 
granted plaintiff by the lower court but also estab-
lish all rights in said claims in defendant. Let the 
plaintiff show the court any evidence that will sup-
port plaintiffs seven years possession and payment 
of taxes immediately prior to the commencement of 
this action or at any time. 
POINT IX. 
A SUCCESSOR TO A GRANT IS ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT ANYTHING IN DEROGATION OF THE DEED 
AS AGAINST A GRANTEE OR THOSE IN PRIVITY 
WITH HIM. 
After the recording of Ex. 2 on May 24, 1934, 
all subsequent assignees of the Jorgensens including 
all of plaintiffs' predecessors in inte1·est and plain-
tiffs were put on notice that there was no severence 
of the surface rights or use of water rights. The 
only right retained was a conditional license which 
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was not assignable and which was conditioned upon 
using the land so as not to interfere with mining, 
and upon the payment of one-half of the general 
taxes. 
Being on notice, plaintiffs and their predeces-
sors could acquire no greater interest in said claims 
than was retained by their assignor. The point above 
stated was for the most part copied from 31 C.J.S. 
298. 
Moreover, a grantor or his successor is estopped 
from giving full force and effect to the conveyance. 
Ex. 2, See 31 C.J.S. 298. Also the statute 57-1-3 
U.C.A. 1953 requires plaintiffs to regard the fee 
as having passed under Ex. 2 to defendants. 
In addition, the third time the Jorgensens con-
\'eyed to Nordell, Entry 110 of the Abstract, both 
Nordell and plaintiffs were on notice that all Nor-
dell received was "The grazing rights upon." They 
were then required to look to the information shown 
in Entry 106 of the Abstract to see how limited those 
rights were. They were limited to grazing only so 
as not to interfere with mining and grazing was 
permitted only upon payment of one-half of the 
general taxes. Moreover, said rights were not avai1-
able to an assignee of grantor or a licensee as shown 
by the instrument itself. 
POINT X. 
EQUITY WILL NOT ENTER AN ORDER IMPOS-
SIBLE TO ENFORCE AND WHICH INVITES TRES-
PASS. 
Ex. 18 shows that the claims involved which 
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ai·e neai· Mercm· ai·e scatte1·ed also see Ex. 19. Cas-
tagno admitted he had to trespass on other claims 
to get to the claims here involved and that said 
claims are, T91-18, landlocked to the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have no right of way over the many other 
claims which surround said other claims here in-
volved. The Hecla claims numbered 3079 and shown 
in green on Ex. 18 are immediately above the word 
Mercur, and are more than 1 ~ miles below the 
Black Shale claim 3029 as shown on Ex. 18, since 
claim 3079 extends more than half way southerly 
through section 5 and 3029 extends part way into 
section 30 two sections above. In other words, plain-
tiffs will be required to trespass over 11/2 miles of 
other claims leased by Ault in 01·der to graze the 
Hecla claims. 
Ex. 14 is the w1·itten lease under which de-
fendants leased 608 acres or all of the claims in-
volved in this litigation to Owen Ault. Said lease 
also involved many other claims, to-wit: 2,200 acres 
of claims all of which are leased to Ault, which to-
gether with other claims leased by Ault from Geyser-
Marion and from McCormick et al comprise a solid 
block which Ault has colored in green on Ex. 18. 
The small area of 608 acres is for the most part 
surrounded by other claims leased by defendant to 
Ault. The map Ex. 18 and the larger map, Ex. 19 
demonstrate that the other claims which are not in· 
volved in this litigation and which are leased by 
defendant to Ault not only sulTound all of the claims 
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near Mercur which are involved in this litigation 
but make it impossible for plaintif to have access to 
them without a trespass on defendants' other claims. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that plaintiff can-
not get to Heclas without trespassing over the three 
Seal claims 3180, Annapolis 3184, Victor 3144, 
South Geyser, Scribner 3260, Sparrow Hawk and 
West Geyser 4944 which claims are leased to Ault 
by defendant and are not involved in this suit but 
which claims surround the Hecla group and with 
other claims leased by Ault make it impossible for 
plaintiff to get into graze the Hecla group without 
trespassing over 1 :Y2 miles of other claims leased 
by Ault. The plaintiff cannot have access to said 
claims and it is impossible for plaintiff to use same 
or grazing or for any other purposes without tres-
passing upon the other 1,593 acres of other claims 
leased by defendant to Ault, as well as trespassing 
upon about 1,000 acres of other claims leased by 
Ault from McCormick et al. 
Plaintiffs have no contiguous or adjacent claims 
and no right of way to enter on said claims. De-
fendants will be in contempt of court if they refuse 
to permit plaintiff to graze said 608 acres of claims 
and plaintiffs will be in trespass upon said 2,500 
acres, in order to graze same. This is true except 
only fo1· several small claims not near Mercur but 
involving a small area disconnected from the Mer-
cur area and southwest of Mercur or the southerly 
end by the Black Sheep claim. Should equity enter 
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a decree which will invite trespass and is hopeless 
to enforce? 
POINT XI. 
A WRITTEN CONTRACT TO CONVEY REAL 
PROPERTY IS MERGED INTO A DEED. 
The above point is copied word for word from 
Knight vs. Southern Pacific, 172 P. 693 -U-. 
Ex. 17 was not the contract which resulted in the 
deed, Ex. 2. Plaintiff did not prove that it was. The 
court erred in receiving it into evidence. Moreover, 
the court gave significant consideration to it, which 
was error. See R 65, where the court bases its deci-
sion on said contract and not on Ex. 2. 
The photostat attached to the last cover sheet 
shows that the courts not only support the law as 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court but declare prior 
contracts null and void and of no further effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK & SCHOENHALS 
E. L. Schoenhals 
903 Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Appellant 
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